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INTRODUCTION
Joe Camel, the hip smoking camel of the 1980s and 1990s was
1
created in 1974 by the British artist Nicholas Price. In 1988, Joe Camel
arrived in the United States to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of
2
R.J. Reynolds’ Camel brand cigarettes. By 1991, children aged five and
six could identify Joe Camel almost as frequently as they could identify
3
Mickey Mouse. Due to outrage from public interest groups and
pressure from an impending lawsuit challenging the targeting of minors
in cigarette advertising, R.J. Reynolds voluntarily ended its Joe Camel
4
campaign in 1997.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the recently passed Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (hereinafter “the Act”) as
it relates to the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers and
retailers. The Act was passed in order to curb the use of tobacco
products by children and, therefore, gives the Food and Drug
Administration (hereinafter “FDA”) broad power to regulate tobacco
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in order to prevent children
5
from becoming addicted to tobacco products. On August 31, 2009,
several tobacco companies filed suit against the FDA alleging First
Amendment speech violations and seeking an injunction preventing the
6
agency from enforcing several marketing and advertising restrictions.
1

Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising; Camel’s Success and Controversy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/business/the-mediabusiness-advertising-camel-s-success-and-controversy.html.
2
Id.
3
Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey
Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991).
4
Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the
state is not preempted by federal law from shielding minors from cigarette advertising);
William Booth, California Sends Joe Camel to an Early Retirement, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
1997, at A10; Yumiko Ono & Bruce Ingersoll, RJR Retires Joe Camel, Adds Sexy Smokers,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 1997, at B1.
5
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2, 3,
123 Stat. 1776, 1779, 1781-82 (2009).
6
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d. 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09CV-117-M)
[hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Complaint”]; see Editorial, Big Tobacco Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES,

DOWGIN (DO NOT DELETE)

412

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/5/2011 7:36 PM

Vol. 35:2

Part I of this Note will describe the background surrounding the
development of the Act along with a brief history of tobacco regulation
in the United States. Part II will examine the 2001 Lorillard decision, in
which a tobacco company successfully challenged regulations that are
7
strikingly similar to the regulations promulgated by the Act. Part III
will discuss the appropriate constitutional framework for analyzing
restrictions on commercial speech. Part IV will address the current
challenge to the Act, and Part V will demonstrate how several of the
Act’s provisions should be held unconstitutional because they
impermissibly restrict commercial speech.
I. BACKGROUND
a. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp
In 1996, the FDA issued “Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children
8
and Adolescents.” Although the agency had never before regulated
9
tobacco products, it asserted jurisdiction over nicotine as a drug based
on the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter “FDCA”), which
grants the FDA the authority to regulate drugs and drug delivery
10
devices. The FDA then promulgated a series of restrictions restraining
tobacco advertising and marketing in order to substantially reduce the
11
availability of these products to children and adolescents. Restrictions
included: a prohibition against free samples, a prohibition against selfservice displays, restriction of advertising to black-and-white text only,
a prohibition against outdoor advertisements within 1000 feet of public
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/07/opinion/07mon1.html.
7
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
8
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996).
9
John Schwartz, Smoke, Letters and Documentation; Tobacco Companies Swamp FDA
With Final Comments on Regulation, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1996, at A20; see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (holding that Congress had
not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products).
10
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397; Marlene Cimons, Cigarette Regulation
Plan Challenged; Tobacco: Five Major Companies Along with Pro-Smoker, Advertising
and Trade Groups Claim FDA Has No Jurisdiction Over Product, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996,
at A11.
11
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397-400.
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playgrounds and schools, a prohibition against advertising in
publications not geared toward adults, and a prohibition against tobacco
manufacturers sponsoring athletic, musical, artistic or other social or
12
cultural events.
13
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the tobacco
industry challenged these regulations on both jurisdictional and First
14
Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held that Congress had not
15
given the FDA authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products.
The Court struck down the regulations, stating that “an administrative
agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress . . . we must take
care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where
16
Congress indicated it would stop.” Thus, the Supreme Court did not
reach the constitutional issue in 2000.
b. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
President Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and
17
Tobacco Control Act into law on June 22, 2009. The Act is a
Congressional response to the Court’s holding in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.; the intent is to give the FDA the express
18
jurisdiction it lacked in 1996. The Act adopts the proposed 1996
“Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,” along with
some new provisions, and states that these regulations are consistent
12

Id. at 44,617-18.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120.
14
Id. at 129-30.
15
Id. at 142. The FDCA requires that the FDA refuse to approve a drug if it is not “safe
and effective for its intended purpose.” Id. (summarizing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938)).
Therefore, if tobacco products were considered under the FDA’s jurisdiction, the FDA
would be required to remove them from the market. Id. at 135.
16
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161. Because the Court determined
that FDA regulation of tobacco products was beyond the scope of the FDCA, it did not
reach the First Amendment challenge. Id.
17
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009); see also Press Release, Matthew Myers, President, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, RJR, Other Tobacco Companies go to Court to Evade Regulation by FDA (Sept.
1, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idus156603+01-Sep2009+PRN20090901.
18
§ 3, 123 Stat. at 1781. The FDA is recognized as the “primary Federal regulatory
authority with respect to the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products.”
Id.
13
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19

with the First Amendment. Congress found that adopting the
regulations will “directly and materially advance the Federal
Government’s substantial interest in reducing the number of children
20
and adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco,” and that
the regulations are “narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and
promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by
21
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use.”
The Act includes several important additions to the 1996
Regulations. For example, by June 22, 2011, the FDA must issue
regulations requiring graphic color warnings on tobacco product
packages to show the harmful effects tobacco products can have on the
22
body. The additional regulations also state that beginning September
22, 2009, cigarettes may no longer contain artificial flavoring other than
23
menthol. Another important component of the Act is the banning of
any new modified risk tobacco product, as well as prohibiting the
24
labeling of tobacco products as “light,” “mild,” or “low tar.” Despite
the seemingly severe restrictions on the tobacco industry, it is important
to note that Congress did not give the FDA unlimited power to regulate
25
the tobacco industry. The FDA does not have the power to ban tobacco
19

Id. § 2.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. § 201. See also Joe Borlik, Disturbing Images Coming to U.S. Cigarette
MICH.
LIFE
(Sept.
9,
2009),
http://www.cmPackages,
CENT.
life.com/2009/09/09/disturbing-images-coming-to-u-s-cigarette-packages/ (describing the
images that potential warning labels could include, such as images of black teeth and rotting
lungs).
23
Id. § 101.
24
§ 101, 123 Stat. at 1812. “The term ‘modified risk tobacco product’ means any
tobacco product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobaccorelated disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.” Id.
25
The Act is an example of Congressional delegation of legislative authority to the
FDA. In 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court held that trade associations/agencies cannot be
considered legislative bodies simply because they had familiarity with the problem of their
industry. “Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly
inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.” A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). Although A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. has never been formally overruled, subsequent cases have held that as long as
there are some guidelines given by Congress, delegation of legislative power is not
unconstitutional. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Truckers Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001)
(finding that where Congress sets out intelligible guiding principles, there is no
constitutional violation). Some commentators have criticized the downfall of the nondelegation doctrine, claiming that “[d]elegation allows legislators to claim credit for benefits
which a regulatory statute promises yet escape the blame for the burdens it will impose,
20
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products entirely, nor can the FDA require the reduction of nicotine
26
levels in tobacco products to zero.
The stated purpose of the Act is to achieve the public health goal of
27
curbing tobacco use by adolescents. After performing extensive
research, Congress found that the United States is currently in a public
health crisis due to tobacco use and the fact that advertising has more of
28
an influence on children than adults. Additionally, Congress found that
reducing tobacco use by minors by just fifty percent would prevent over
10,000,000 children from becoming regular smokers and would save
29
$75,000,000,000 in reduced health care costs. The Congressional
findings also note that tobacco manufacturers make false and
misleading statements regarding modified risk products, and that the
government has a compelling interest in “ensuring that statements about
modified risk tobacco products are complete, accurate, and relate to the
30
overall disease risk of the product.”
c. Pre-Existing Tobacco Regulation
Even prior to 1996, federal regulations rigorously limited how and
where tobacco products could be advertised, sold, and used. Beginning
in 1971 with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, it
became illegal for cigarettes and little cigars to be advertised on “any
medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the
31
Federal Communications Commission.” This provision effectively
banned the advertisement of tobacco products on the radio or television.
Another federal regulation requires a conspicuous warning statement to
be placed on all tobacco products, such as “SURGEON GENERAL’S
WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
32
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.” In 1992, the federal
because they do not issue the laws needed to achieve those benefits.” DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 10 (1993).
26
§101, 123 Stat. at 1803.
27
Id. § 2.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2011). Little cigars are smoke products that resemble
cigarettes and are wrapped in tobacco leaves. Julia Cartwright, Little Cigar Consumption on
the Rise, While Cigarette Use Declines, AM. LEGACY FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2009, 6:54 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idus275857+04-Feb-2009+PRN20090204.
32
15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (West 2011).
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government passed a law making a grant available to states contingent
33
on the banning of the sale of tobacco products to minors. Other current
federal regulations include taxes on cigarettes and a prohibition against
34
smoking in or around federal buildings.
There are also restrictions at the state level. Just over half of all
states have enacted some form of smoke-free law prohibiting smoking
35
in public places such as workplaces, restaurants and bars. New Jersey
enacted the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, banning smoking
36
in all bars and restaurants, but not on beaches or in city parks. New
York passed a similar law in 2003, banning smoking in bars and
37
restaurants, on public transportation, and in indoor arenas. Both New
York and New Jersey allow for local municipalities to regulate smoking
38
more stringently than the state law provides. For example, New York
City recently passed a controversial law banning smoking in city parks
39
and on public beaches. In September 2009, Mayor Michael Bloomberg
publicly stated that the City intended to make it “as difficult and as
40
expensive to smoke as we possibly can.” In May 2009, North Carolina,
a state with a rich history of tobacco cultivation, banned smoking in all
41
restaurants and bars.
33

42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-26 (West 2011). Minors in this instance are persons under the
age of eighteen. Id.
34
27 C.F.R. § 40.23 (2009); Protecting Federal Employees and the Public From
Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Federal Workplace, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,360 (Dec. 22,
2008).
35
The Associated Press, Halfway There, Smoking Ban Movement Sets Sights on Rest of
Nation, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 2007, at 7B.
36
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-58 (West 2006).
37
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-O (McKinney 2008).
38
“The provisions of this act shall supersede any other statute…concerning smoking in
an indoor public place…except for those provisions of a municipal ordinance which provide
restrictions on or prohibitions against smoking equivalent to, or greater than, those provided
under this act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-63. “Nothing herein shall be construed to restrict
the power of any county, city, town, or village to adopt and enforce additional local law,
ordinances, or regulations which comply with at least the minimum applicable standards set
forth in this article.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-R (McKinney 2011).
39
See, e.g., Editorial, Too Much of a Good Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/opinion/05sat4.html.
40
David Seifman, Anti-smoking Mike Dubious of ‘Cig-arrests’, N.Y. POST, Sept. 16,
2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/anti_smoking_mike_dubious_of_cig_8dqwzX
pJdbOAX1pWxsAlCJ.
41
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-496 (West 2010); Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill,
Tobacco Farming the Old Way, LEARN NC, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchistnewsouth/4386 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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In addition to government regulation of conduct and product usage,
the tobacco industry voluntarily ceased certain advertising and
marketing practices in a November 1998 Master Settlement Agreement
42
with the Attorneys General of forty-six states. In exchange for the
settlement of lawsuits against the tobacco industry, the manufacturers
agreed to cease targeting children in the advertisement and promotion of
43
tobacco products. Additionally, tobacco companies agreed to refrain
from lobbying against legislation aimed at reducing youth smoking, and
also contributed funds to set up a National Foundation to support
44
programs aimed at reducing youth tobacco usage.
At a press conference discussing the Master Settlement Agreement,
the Attorney General of Massachusetts, Scott Harshbarger, announced
that he was planning to propose additional consumer protection
45
regulations in the future. Harshbarger intended to further restrict the
advertising and sales practices of tobacco companies in order to reduce
“the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by
46
children under legal age.” These additional regulations imposed on
tobacco companies by Massachusetts were met with constitutional
challenges in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.
II. LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. V. REILLY: A SUCCESSFUL
CHALLENGE TO TOBACCO REGULATIONS
In January 1999, just three months after the Master Settlement
Agreement was signed, Massachusetts Attorney General Harshbarger
42

Participating manufacturers included Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, Philip Morris,
and R.J. Reynolds. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, ST. OF CAL. DEPARTMENT OF
JUST. – OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf (last visited
May 5, 2011) [hereinafter MSA]. Beginning in 1994, forty-six states filed suit against the
tobacco industry attempting to recover Medicaid and other public health expenses caused by
smoking-related illnesses. See, e.g., Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
Application and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies
and Various States, and State Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of
MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R. 6th 435 (2005). On November 23, 1998, the MSA was entered
into wherein the tobacco manufacturers agreed to limit certain marketing and advertising
practices, as well as promote programs aimed at reducing youth smoking. Id.
43
MSA, supra note 43, at 14. Tobacco companies would no longer use cartoons in
advertisements, sponsor events targeted at children, distribute free samples except at adultonly events, pay media companies to reference their products when not directed at adults, or
give gifts in consideration of tobacco purchase without requiring proof of age. Id.
44
Id. at 25.
45
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001).
46
Id. at 533.
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promulgated a series of regulations that were broader than the scope of
47
the settlement. The regulations included a ban on outdoor advertising
within 1000 feet of any public playground or school, a prohibition
against indoor advertisements located lower than five feet from the
48
ground, and restrictions on certain retail sales practices. The
49
restrictions applied to cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars.
Tobacco manufacturers challenged the regulations on the basis that
they were pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (hereinafter “FCLAA”), and were unconstitutional on
50
First Amendment free speech grounds. The Supreme Court found that
since the FCLAA applies exclusively to cigarettes, the FCLAA pre51
empted the state law as it applied to cigarettes only. Therefore,
although the Court did not address the constitutionality of the cigarette
provisions, it did have the opportunity to analyze the provisions relating
to smokeless tobacco and cigars for compliance with the First
52
Amendment.
The Court evaluated the regulations for constitutional soundness
using the four-part test for commercial speech stated in Central Hudson
53
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York:
(1) The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;
(2) The government interest must be substantial;
(3) The regulation must directly advance the government interest;
and
47

Id. at 533-34.
The restrictions also prohibited indoor advertising visible from the outside and
advertising in an enclosed stadium. The regulated retail sales practices included banning
self-service displays of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, as well as forcing retailers to place
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in areas that are not accessible to consumers. Many of
these regulations are identical or similar to the provisions of the 1996 FDA regulations, and
the current Act. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,399 (Aug.
28, 1996); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.04 (2000); e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at
534-35.
49
940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.02, 22.02 (2000); e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at
534-36.
50
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 532.
51
Id. at 553.
52
Id. The Court noted that the cigarette petitioners only raised pre-emption challenges
as to the outdoor advertising and indoor advertising restrictions, but not the sales practices
restrictions. Therefore, the Court evaluated the retail sales practices for constitutional
soundness for cigarettes as well as cigars and smokeless tobacco. Id.
53
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
48
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(4) The regulation can not be more extensive than necessary to
54
accomplish the government interest.

The Court recognized that there had been some debate in the past
over whether commercial speech should even be treated separately from
regular speech, as restrictions on regular speech are subject to strict
55
scrutiny. The tobacco companies argued for the application of strict
scrutiny instead of the Central Hudson framework, but the Court
ultimately found that there was no need to break new ground; Central
56
Hudson provided an “adequate basis for decision.” The Court held that
regulations on outdoor and indoor advertising were unconstitutional,
57
while the direct regulations on sales practices were constitutional.
Both sides conceded the first two prongs of Central Hudson with
regard to both the indoor and outdoor advertising: the advertising
concerned lawful activity and was not misleading, and the government
had a substantial interest in preventing the use of tobacco products by
58
minors. The third prong of the Central Hudson test states that
regulations must “directly and materially advance the government
interest” and that “this burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or
59
conjecture.” The State put forth the studies that the FDA had
60
conducted for the proposed regulations in 1996. In those studies, the
FDA found that the adolescent years are when most smokers first use
tobacco products and that advertising plays a central role in this
61
decision. The Court determined that the State provided “ample
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco

54
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp., 447
U.S. at 566).
55
Id. The Central Hudson Court developed a separate framework for analyzing
commercial speech because of the “distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and
other varieties of speech.” Id.
56
Id. at 554-55. Justice Thomas’ concurrence in this case argues that strict scrutiny
should apply where the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress
ideas it conveys. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57
Id. at 566-67, 569.
58
Id. at 555.
59
Id.
60
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 557.
61
Id. at 557-58. The FDA studies only included cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. The
Attorney General also produced evidence of the rising use of cigars by minors and the link
between advertising and youth cigar use. Id. at 560.
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and cigars” with respect to outdoor advertising. Given the strong
connection between advertising and youth smoking, the Court held that
63
the proposed regulations would, in fact, advance the state goal.
Therefore, the third prong of Central Hudson was satisfied.
Despite satisfying the first three prongs, the Court determined that
the outdoor regulations did not satisfy the fourth prong and were
64
therefore invalid. The fourth step requires a reasonable fit between the
65
means and the ends of the scheme. The Court explained that “the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials . . .
does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed
66
to adults.” A complete ban on the communication of truthful speech
about a lawful product to adult consumers violates the Constitution
because the tobacco retailers have a right to convey this information and
67
adult smokers have the right to hear it. Here, the extensive reach of the
regulations would end up preventing advertising completely in major
metropolitan areas of Massachusetts, as the 1000-foot radii around
68
playgrounds and schools would likely overlap and cover entire cities.
Additionally, the 1000-foot requirement was seemingly arbitrary and
chosen only because that was what the FDA had intended to do in
69
1996. Moreover, the Court noted that “the impact of a restriction on
speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place. The FDA’s
70
regulations would have had widely disparate effects nationwide.”
The indoor advertising requirements met a similar fate. Although
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test were met, both the third
71
and fourth prongs of the test were violated. The goal of preventing
minors from having access to tobacco products was purported to be
directly advanced by the five-foot requirement, which forced retailers to
ensure that any indoor advertising was always higher than five feet from

62

Id. at 561.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”).
67
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564.
68
Id. at 562.
69
Id. at 562-63.
70
Id. at 563.
71
Id. at 566.
63
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72

the ground. This height requirement intended to keep tobacco
73
advertisements out of the typical viewing range of children, however,
the Court criticized this particular method because many minors are
taller than five feet, and even if they are not, they can still see the
74
advertisement when they look up. Therefore, the regulation did not
directly advance any legitimate government interest.
The indoor advertising regulations also failed the fourth prong
because the regulation did not reasonably fit the goal of preventing
75
children from using tobacco. The Court found other less-restrictive
alternatives that would prevent youth-targeted tobacco advertisements,
76
such as preventing floor-level, candy-like displays. Although the
burden imposed on commercial speech by the indoor regulations would
be very small, there is no “de minimis exception for a speech restriction
77
that lacks sufficient tailoring or justification.” The restriction on height
was an unconstitutional restriction of the tobacco companies’ First
78
Amendment rights.
Although the restrictions on advertising were invalidated by the
Court, the sales practices restrictions were upheld as constitutionally
79
permissible direct regulation on conduct. There was a disagreement
between the District Court and the Court of Appeals as to whether
restrictions on the physical location of tobacco products implicate any
80
speech interest at all. The Supreme Court found that the question did
not need to be answered because even if speech interests were
implicated by the restriction on product displays, these particular
81
regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The first two prongs
of Central Hudson were satisfied, as with the indoor and outdoor
82
advertising restrictions. The regulations passed the third prong of the
test because unattended displays of tobacco products give minors access
72

Id.
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 566.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 567.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 569.
80
Id. at 568. The District Court found that there was no speech interest involved,
whereas the Circuit Court determined that self-service displays do have “some
communicative commercial function.” Id.
81
Id. at 569.
82
Id.
73
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to cigarettes, cigars, and/or smokeless tobacco without having to show
83
proof of age. Prohibiting self-service displays is a successful way to
ensure that children will not have direct access to handling tobacco
products. Finally, the fourth prong of the test was satisfied because the
regulations “leave open ample channels of communication [and] . . . do
84
not significantly impede adult access to tobacco products.” Adult
smokers are still able to ask sales personnel for the tobacco product so
85
that they can inspect the product prior to purchase.
Lorillard sets up an important framework for any evaluation of the
Act because it demonstrates how the Supreme Court will likely evaluate
the First Amendment challenge by the tobacco industry. Additionally,
since one of the challenged provisions in the Act is identical to the
outdoor advertising restriction struck down by the Court in 2001,
Lorillard is extremely relevant because it shows how the Supreme
86
Court dealt with the exact regulation at issue.
III. IS CENTRAL HUDSON STILL THE APPROPRIATE TEST?
In 1976, the Supreme Court determined that the special nature of
commercial speech allowed states to regulate potentially deceptive
87
speech more stringently than other forms of speech. However, it also
recognized for the first time that commercial speech is, in fact, entitled
88
to some form of First Amendment protection. The Court decided
Central Hudson in 1980, promulgating a four-part test for the
constitutionality of commercial speech, and since then several justices,
particularly Justice Clarence Thomas, have criticized the test. In Justice
Thomas’s opinion, as well as the opinions of several others, when the
government is attempting to regulate to keep truthful information from
reaching the public, there should be no difference between non83

Id.
Id.
85
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 570.
86
The Act adopts the 1996 regulations that were proposed by the FDA. Congress
directed the FDA to modify these regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lorillard Tobacco Co. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.
111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1831 (2009).
87
Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976)
(“The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”).
88
Id. at 763 (“[A] particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial
information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate.”).
84
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89

commercial and commercial speech. “[Where] the government’s
asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in
order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the Central
Hudson test should not be applied because such an interest is per se
90
illegitimate. . .” Those sharing Justice Thomas’ opinion argue that
strict scrutiny, rather than Central Hudson, should apply because there
is no “basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’
91
than non-commercial speech.” In response, the government argues that
a regulation on speech that “promotes socially harmful activities”
should be subject to a lesser standard than Central Hudson and should
92
be given highly deferential treatment. In the past, the Court has
uniformly rejected both arguments, refusing to “break new ground”
where the Central Hudson test provides an adequate test upon which to
93
make a decision.
Although Central Hudson appears to remain the appropriate test to
determine the constitutionality of commercial speech, over the past two
decades the test has not always been applied consistently. The Supreme
Court has, over time, given less deference to the government and has
come closer to a strict scrutiny test for commercial speech. It is useful to
briefly visit several cases in order to determine how a court is likely to
apply the Central Hudson analysis to the Act at issue.
a. 1986: Deference to the Government
In 1986, in Posadas v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme
Court upheld a Puerto Rican restriction on the advertisement of casinos,
94
finding that it satisfied the Central Hudson test. The Games of Chance
Act of 1948 was amended in 1972 to state that, “no gambling room
shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the

89
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
90
Id.
91
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Posadas v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 350 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995) (finding that there should
be no exception to the Central Hudson standard regardless of the allegedly harmful activity
being advertised).
93
E.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002).
94
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 331.
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95

public of Puerto Rico.” A lower court narrowed the interpretation of
the statute to mean that the only advertising that was prohibited was
advertising aimed to attract Puerto Rican residents, not advertising
96
aimed at tourists, even if it would incidentally reach residents. The
Supreme Court thus based their evaluation of the regulation upon the
97
narrowed construction.
As a threshold matter, the Court determined that the advertising
aimed at Puerto Rican residents concerned a lawful activity and was not
98
misleading, and therefore satisfied Central Hudson’s first prong. The
Court found that the government satisfied prong two because it had a
substantial interest in reducing gambling among citizens in order to
99
promote the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Prong three was
fulfilled because the Court found it reasonable that a reduction in
100
advertising would result in reduced demand for gambling. The
Posadas Court applied a seemingly low standard for the government to
meet here; no substantive proof was required so long as the legislature
had a subjectively reasonable belief that the restrictions would reduce
101
gambling. Prong four, requiring a reasonable fit between the means
and the goal, was also satisfied due to the narrowing construction that
102
the lower court had given the statute. In addition to stating that the
regulations passed constitutional muster, the Court made the
controversial statement that if the legislature has the authority to
completely ban an activity, as they did with gambling, then included
95

Id. at 332 (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1948) (amended 1972)).
Id. at 334-35. This interpretation has been codified by Puerto Rico. “It shall be illegal
for any holder of a gambling license or his/her agents or employees to advertise or offer any
gambling room to the public in any other way, except when the publicity is directed to the
foreign tourists and not to the residents of Puerto Rico. Provided, however, [t]hat an
advertisement directed to the foreign tourists shall not be illegal should it incidentally reach
the residents of Puerto Rico.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (emphasis added).
97
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 339.
98
Id. at 340-41.
99
Id. at 341.
100
Id. at 341-42. The Court also stated that prong three was further proven by the fact
that the appellant chose to litigate the case all the way to the Supreme Court. If advertising
did not reduce demand, then there would be no need to challenge restrictions on it. Id. at
342.
101
Id. at 341-42.
102
Id. at 343 (“The narrowing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by
the Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino gambling
aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of
Puerto Rico.”).
96
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within that power is necessarily the lesser power to restrict
103
advertising. The Posadas Court gave the state broad power to regulate
commercial speech even where the state did not show any substantive
proof that the restrictions would achieve the acknowledged legitimate
goal. Additionally, the Court would be even more deferential to the
government where they had the power to completely ban the activity
that was being advertised. After Posadas, so long as the subject of the
speech was an activity that the State could directly regulate, it was not
unconstitutional to restrict, or even prohibit advertising.
b. 1990s: Trend Toward Stricter Application of Central Hudson
i. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island
In 1996, Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the price of liquor was
struck down as an impermissible restriction on commercial speech in 44
104
Liquormart v. Rhode Island. In only ten years, the Court made a
dramatic shift toward viewing government restrictions on commercial
speech with more scrutiny. In the plurality opinion, the Court stated that
there are special concerns that arise where the government “suppres[ses]
105
commercial speech in order to pursue a non-speech related policy.”
This decision distinguished between two types of commercial speech
regulations: regulations that protect the public against bad sales
practices and regulations that prevent information from reaching the
106
public. In the first instance, the “purpose of the regulation is consistent
with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial
107
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.” However
regarding the second type of regulation, where there is a limitation put
on truthful speech that is not related to consumer protection, but is
instead aimed at preventing information from reaching the public,
“there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
108
Amendment generally demands.” The Court held that the second type
of speech restriction is based on an impermissible government motive to
103

Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. This was in response to appellant’s argument that if
gambling is legal, then the government should not be allowed to restrict advertising to
reduce demand for a legal activity. Id.
104
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
105
Id. at 500.
106
Id. at 501.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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protect the public from “respond[ing] irrationally” to truthful
109
information. The First Amendment requires that the public be able to
assess the value of this type of information without government
110
interference.
Before applying the Central Hudson test, the Court noted that the
Rhode Island advertising ban fell within this second form of speech
restriction, and that “speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive
constitutional review.” Similarly, it is also clear that the advertising
provisions of the Act fall within this same category of speech
restriction. These provisions are an attempt by the federal government
to prevent truthful information about tobacco products from reaching
the American adult public in order to pursue a non-speech related
policy, lowering the smoking rate in the United States. The Act does not
focus on bad sales practices, but rather on limiting the way in which
truthful, non-misleading information can reach the public.
As a threshold matter in 44 Liquormart, the Court accepted that the
restricted speech, the advertisement of liquor prices, was truthful and
111
non-misleading speech about a lawful product. The asserted state
112
interest here was temperance, a reduction in alcohol consumption.
There was no discussion regarding the validity of this state interest;
rather the Court moved directly to prong three after some clarification
113
of Rhode Island’s intentions. Therefore, in 1996, courts were mostly
deferring to legislatures regarding the permissible objective prong.
The Court then broke away from the deferential standard set out in
Posadas by requiring actual proof of a direct advancement of the state
goals in order to satisfy the third prong. “A commercial speech
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government’s purpose. . .the State bears the burden of
showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also
114
that it will do so ‘to a material degree.’” Here, a mere rational belief
on the part of the legislature was not enough to pass Central Hudson’s
109

Id. at 503.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497 (“it is precisely this kind of choice, between the
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for us.” (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976))).
111
Id. at 504.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 504 n.14.
114
Id. at 505. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
110
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prong three as it did in Posadas. “Such speculation certainly does not
suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for
115
paternalistic ends.” As Rhode Island did not introduce any actual
evidence proving that its prohibition would significantly reduce
alcoholism and alcohol consumption, its regulations failed the third
116
prong.
Finally, the Court found that the regulations failed Central
Hudson’s fourth prong because it was clear that there were other options
available to the state that did not involve an impermissible restriction on
117
speech. The Court listed a myriad of alternatives, from increased
118
taxation to educational campaigns. Most notably, the Court rejected
the Posadas reasoning that the power to ban necessarily includes the
119
power to restrict speech. “Contrary to the assumption made in
Posadas, we think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes
120
prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.” Although the speech
related to a “vice” activity, which could be directly outlawed, the Court
found that the restrictions on speech still needed to pass constitutional
muster under the fourth Central Hudson prong, as there is no vice
121
exception to the First Amendment. Where there are direct regulations
available to attain a state goal, a restriction on speech instead is
122
impermissible.
This stricter interpretation of the Central Hudson test is a great
departure from the more deferential standard promulgated by the
Posadas Court. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that the
“stricter, more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central
Hudson. . .could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward [his]
123
position.” Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome of the decision,
that the government may not aim to keep consumers ignorant in order to
decrease demand for legal products, but he did not necessarily think the
115

Id. at 507.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506.
117
Id. at 507.
118
Id.
119
“[W]e are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment
analysis.” Id. at 509.
120
Id. at 511.
121
Id. at 514; see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995).
122
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524.
123
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, v. United
States 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
116
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Central Hudson analysis was necessary in order to reach this result.
ii. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States

The Court had an opportunity to apply 44 Liquormart to a new set
of facts in 1999 in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United
125
The restriction at issue in that case was a federal statute
States.
preventing radio broadcasters from carrying advertisements for private
126
casino gambling. The Fifth Circuit held that under Posadas, gambling
was a vice activity that could be banned altogether by the legislature,
therefore, the power to restrict speech was necessarily included within
127
the broader power to ban. While a petition for certiorari was pending,
128
the Court decided 44 Liquormart. Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision
was reversed and the case was remanded so that the Central Hudson test
would be applied more strictly, consistent with the recent
129
developments. The Supreme Court later granted a new petition for
certiorari after the Fifth Circuit held that the restrictions directly
advanced a state interest and were no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest, thereby satisfying prongs three and four of Central
130
Hudson.
The Supreme Court found that the restrictions satisfied prong one,
as the speech was not misleading and it concerned private casino
131
gambling, which was a lawful activity in the particular states. The
asserted government interests in promulgating these restrictions were
twofold: reducing the social costs associated with gambling and
132
assisting states that prohibit gambling entirely. Although the Court
ultimately held that these interests satisfied prong two because they
could be considered to be substantial, it took a close look at the state’s
motives and stated that that the characterization of these motives as
substantial was “by no means self evident,” because the social costs of
133
gambling are sometimes outweighed by other policy considerations.
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 525-26.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 173.
Id. at 176 (discussing 18 U.S.C § 1304 (1948)).
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 184.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
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Prior to this decision, it was rare for the Court to question the legitimacy
of a government interest; the fact that the Court questioned the motive
behind the state interest suggests a further step towards a much stricter
application of the Central Hudson analysis.
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n Court found that
these restrictions failed prongs three and four because they did not
directly advance the government interest, and because they were
134
overbroad and inconsistent. The Court did not accept the assertion that
the reduction of advertising would reduce overall demand for gambling
because there were other types of non-private casinos (such as casinos
135
136
on Indian reservations) that could still advertise. The ultimate effect
of the regulation would “merely channel gamblers to one casino rather
137
than another.” Additionally, the Court found that the statute failed
prong four because it was “so pierced by exemptions and
138
inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”
There can be no reasonable fit between a government interest and the
means used to implement it where the statute is, at some points,
139
inconsistent or unrelated to the asserted interest. This was an issue
with this statute because it prohibited broadcasters from playing
advertisements for private casinos, but advertisements by tribal casinos,
non-profit casinos, government-operated gambling, and “occasional and
140
ancillary” commercial casinos were exempt. Finally, the Court also
found several alternatives to speech restrictions that would help the
government achieve its goals, such as controls on casino admissions,
141
betting limits, or licensing requirements. The overarching theme of the
Court’s decision was that the Government had adopted an inconsistent
policy that sacrificed too much legitimate commercial speech to be
142
within constitutional bounds.
c. Recent Decisions: Continuing Trend Toward Strict Scrutiny
A more recent decision explicitly held that speech regulation must
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 187 n.5.
Id. at 189.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 189.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 194-95.
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be a last resort in order to attain government objectives. In Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, the Supreme Court invalidated
provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act that
144
restricted advertisements promoting compounded drugs. By 2002, the
Central Hudson test was firmly established as the correct analytical
framework for commercial speech cases as reflected by the fact that
neither party challenged its application by requesting a more lenient or
145
more stringent standard. Although the Court noted that several of its
members had previously questioned the appropriateness of Central
Hudson, there was no need to create a new framework where the current
146
one provides an “adequate basis for decision;” it cited to both
Lorillard and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n as examples of
147
recent decisions applying Central Hudson.
As with the prior cases, prongs one and two were satisfied in this
case because the speech was not misleading, was related to lawful
148
activity, and the government interest in public safety was substantial.
The government was concerned that if compound drug advertising were
149
allowed, new drugs could enter the market without FDA approval. It
argued that the restrictions met prong three (direct advancement of the
public safety goal) because pharmacists would not be able to market
150
compounded drugs on a large scale. The Court allowed the
government’s explanation to suffice here, despite the fact that it relied
on some unsupported assumptions about the requirement for large-scale
151
advertising in order to successfully market a drug. This was not a step
back toward the direction of Posadas, however. The Court only allowed
the assumption because it found that, regardless of prong three, the
143

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (1998); id.
Drug compounding is a process that is taught in pharmacy schools whereby a doctor or
pharmacist combines or alters medications in order to tailor them to specific patient needs.
See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360-61.
145
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367.
146
Id. at 368.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 368-69.
149
Id. at 371.
150
Id.
151
“Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large scale without
advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed
‘directly advance[e]’ the Government’s interests.” Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (citing Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
144
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restrictions were invalid because they failed prong four: “. . .the
Government has failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions are
152
‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interest[s].’”
In order to satisfy prong four, the government must prove that
there was no other way to achieve its interests other than by restricting
153
speech. Here, there was no evidence that the government ever
154
considered any alternatives other than the restriction on advertising.
After the Court listed several non-speech related regulations that would
directly accomplish the government’s goal, such as compounding only
155
in response to a prescription, it invalidated the statute. This decision
firmly rejected the idea that “government has an interest in preventing
the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent
members of the public from making bad decisions with the
156
information.” Therefore, going forward, a fear that the public will
make bad choices is not a sufficient justification for preventing the
dissemination of truthful information.
d. Future Predictions for Central Hudson Analysis
Despite the fact that the Central Hudson test has been criticized in
the past, it is likely that courts will apply a strict version of Central
Hudson to commercial speech cases in the future, as no alternative legal
analytical framework has been as extensively developed. This is the
appropriate test because it sets a middle ground for commercial speech.
On one hand, the government has an interest in ensuring that people are
not misled as they enter into commercial transactions. However, the
government may not have paternalistic motives in its regulation of
commercial speech. The First Amendment guarantees that adult citizens
have the right to personally evaluate truthful information about lawful
157
products. The Central Hudson test allows courts to balance the
interests of the government against the interests of the public.
Although Justice Thomas proposed several times that Central
152

Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566).
Id.
154
Id. at 373.
155
Id. at 377.
156
Id. at 374.
157
E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (“so long as the sale
and use of tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in
communicating information about its products and adult customers have an interest in
receiving that information.”).
153
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Hudson has no role where the government is aiming to suppress
information about a lawful product, and instead such restrictions should
158
be per se invalid , the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly thrown out
the Central Hudson test in favor of such a theory. Instead, a court will
closely scrutinize the regulation and a strict interpretation of Central
Hudson in line with Thompson will be used to evaluate the First
Amendment challenge to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act. If the Act’s regulations are found to be paternalistic,
ineffective, or overbroad, then they will fail the Central Hudson test and
should therefore be held unconstitutional.
IV. BIG TOBACCO’S CURRENT CHALLENGE TO THE FAMILY
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
On August 31, 2009, two of the three largest American tobacco
companies filed suit against the government in the United States District
159
Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs in this challenge
included R.J. Reynolds, the second largest tobacco seller in the country
160
and the maker of Camel cigarettes, and Lorillard, the third largest
161
tobacco seller and the maker of Newport cigarettes. Noticeably absent
from the lawsuit was Philip Morris, the largest tobacco company in the
162
United States and the maker of Marlboro cigarettes. Upon first glance,
it is surprising that the largest tobacco company did not challenge the
highly restrictive laws; however, upon closer inspection of the Act, the
reasoning becomes clear: the FDA is unlikely to approve any new
tobacco products, thus locking in the market share and eliminating
163
competition for the current number one company. This also explains
why R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard are fighting so hard to prevent the
advertising restrictions from being put into effect. If new products will
not be approved, it is even more important for these companies to be
158

See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
159
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d. 512 (W.D. Ky.
2010); Big Tobacco Strikes Back, supra note 6.
160
Duff Wilson, A Vote Nears for a Tobacco Bill That Philip Morris Can Live With,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E4DD
123CF932A35757C0A96F9C8B63.
161
The Associated Press, 2 Tobacco Giants File Suit to Block Marketing Rules, NORTH
JERSEY.COM (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.northjersey.com/news/56479952.html.
162
Wilson, supra note 160.
163
Id.
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able to contact existing adult smokers to convince them to switch
brands. Thus, the relief requested in the Complaint was a declaratory
judgment that the soon-to-be-implemented regulations are
164
unconstitutional. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions preventing the FDA from enforcing the allegedly
165
unconstitutional provisions of the Act.
The plaintiffs did not challenge the Act in its entirety. Rather, the
Complaint pointed to ten specific provisions of the Act that the
plaintiffs found objectionable and unconstitutional because they
eliminate the few arenas tobacco companies have left to communicate
166
with adult consumers. On January 4, 2010, the Western District of
Kentucky found that two of the challenged provisions of the Act violate
167
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.
ruled that the FDA could not enforce the ban against color and graphics
or the restriction against making statements that suggest tobacco
168
products are less harmful due to compliance with FDA regulations.
a. Ban on Color and Graphics
The Act’s ban on the use of color and graphics directed the FDA to
re-issue the 1996 regulation that limited advertisements to black text on
169
a white background (or vice versa). This was supported by a
Congressional finding that “text only requirements. . .will help reduce
underage use of tobacco products,” and the government had argued in
the past that the industry had “exploited adolescents’ vulnerability to
170
imagery.” The court accepted plaintiffs’ argument that images of their
164

Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 8.
Id.
166
Id. at 12. The tobacco companies specifically challenge the Act’s: (1) ban on using
color or images in advertising; (2) mandated warnings on tobacco packages; (3) ban on
truthful statements regarding modified risk tobacco products; (4) ban on outdoor
advertising; (5) ban on brand name sponsorship of events; (6) ban on brand name
merchandise; (7) ban on references to the FDA; (8) ban on product samples; (9) ban on joint
product marketing; and (10) ban on promotions offering gifts in consideration of the
purchase of tobacco products. Id. at 13-29.
167
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525-26, 535
(W.D. Ky. 2010).
168
See id.; Michael Felberbaum, Judge OKs Color, Graphics in Ads, HERALD SUN
(Durham), Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/5445168/article-JudgeOKs-color--graphics-in-ads.
169
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201,
123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009).
170
Id. § 2; United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 571 (D.D.C.
165
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brand symbols and use of color communicate important information
171
about their product to adults. Interestingly, the court did not make any
specific mention of the Central Hudson prongs, yet it is evident from
the opinion that this regulation failed prongs three and four. Banning the
use of all symbols and colors would not directly advance the
government interest in preventing children from smoking because there
was no evidence to support the fact that all images and colors encourage
172
children to smoke. Judge McKinley stated that “there is no suggestion
in any of the literature cited by the government that symbols such as
National’s Beech-Nut chewing tobacco insignia. . .[or] the color of
Lorillard’s Newport menthol cigarette packaging. . .are a part of what
Congress found to be problematic associative advertising techniques
173
aimed at minors.” Thus, the government did not meet its burden of
showing that the ban on color and graphics would materially advance its
interest in preventing children from smoking.
The ban on color and graphics also failed prong four of the Central
Hudson test. Here, the judge quoted from Central Hudson: “[t]he
regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves. The
State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state
interest. . .nor can it completely suppress information when narrower
174
restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well.” The court
ruled that even if there was a direct connection between some graphics
and color and youth smoking, the ban was a “blanket ban” and was
175
overbroad. Less restrictive alternatives exist to prevent advertisements
targeting children, such as only banning colors and images that have a
176
special appeal to children. Therefore, the District Court found the
black and white text only advertising requirement to be
177
unconstitutional.
b. Ban on Statements Regarding FDA Approval
The District Court also struck down the provision of the Act that
2006).
171

Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 565 (1980)).
175
Id. at 525-26.
176
Id.
177
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
172
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178

bans any mention of the FDA regulation of tobacco. The ban was on
any statement made by anyone, express or implied, directed to
179
consumers, that products were safer because the FDA regulated them.
The court did not need to evaluate this regulation through the Central
Hudson lens because it found that the ban regulated more than just
180
commercial speech. Plaintiffs successfully argued that “almost any
public comment on these ‘product standards’. . .could be construed as
an ‘implied’ statement that they made Plaintiffs’ products ‘less
181
harmful.’” The court agreed that journalists, doctors, scientists, and
politicians have an interest in commenting on the FDA regulations and
that it is “without question that the ban applies to more than just
182
commercial speech and must satisfy strict scrutiny.” The problematic
issue for Judge McKinley was that Congress did not limit this provision
to speech by tobacco companies. Therefore, federal law prohibited other
professionals from publicly commenting on the FDA regulations.
Because the government did not even attempt to put forth enough
evidence to satisfy strict scrutiny, the regulation was ruled
183
unconstitutional.
Although Judge McKinley overturned two provisions of the Act,
184
he upheld the other eight challenged provisions. On March 5, 2010,
the tobacco companies filed an appeal from the order upholding the
185
challenged provisions, and three days later, the government filed an
appeal from the order preventing the FDA from enforcing the two
186
overturned provisions. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit will have the
opportunity to evaluate all ten challenges to determine whether the Act
violates the First Amendment rights of the tobacco companies.
V. UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON, SEVERAL ACT PROVISIONS
178

Id. at 535.
21 U.S.C. § 331(tt), amended by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 103, 123 Stat. 1776, 1834 (2009).
180
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See generally Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512
(W.D. Ky. 2010).
185
Plaintiffs’ Joint Notice of Appeal, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678
F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-117-M).
186
Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-117-M).
179
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SHOULD BE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Based on the analysis discussed in Part IV, the District Court
came to the correct conclusions regarding the ban on color and graphics
and the ban on statements regarding FDA approval. The ban on color
and graphics fails the Central Hudson test because there is no clear
connection between all color and images in advertising and youth
smoking, and because it is overbroad in scope. Similarly, the injunction
against enforcing the ban on statements regarding FDA approval was
properly granted, since it fails the fourth prong of Central Hudson.
Although the court did not evaluate this regulation under the
commercial speech lens, it is apparent that even if it had, it would have
failed. While the government’s goal of preventing false claims of “FDA
approval” in advertisements would be met, the regulation was not
narrowly tailored. It was more extensive than necessary to accomplish
government goals, as it targeted any statement, made by anyone,
187
express or implied, if it was directed at consumers.
The regulations published by the FDA on March 19, 2010 address
the ban on color and graphics, but ignore the ban on statements
188
regarding FDA approval. Due to the pending litigation, the FDA has
stated that it will not exercise its enforcement discretion against
companies who continue to use color and graphics until the issue has
189
been resolved in court. The fact that no regulations were issued
regarding compliance with the ban on statements concerning FDA
approval suggests that the FDA is not pursuing enforcement of this
provision at this time. Interestingly, the Draft Guidance for Industry
published by the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products states that the
190
regulations only apply to manufacturers, retailers, and distributers.
Thus, even when the regulations are limited to regulating tobacco
companies, and therefore potentially come close to compliance with the
First Amendment, the FDA may choose to proceed with caution in that
187

21 U.S.C. §331(tt), amended by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 301, 123 Stat. 1776, 1834 (2009).
188
21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010).
189
CTR. FOR TOBACCO PRODS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES
AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3 (June 2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/UCM214424.pdf.
190
Id. at 4-5.
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area.
The remainder of this Note will suggest that four specific
provisions that were not overturned by the District Court should have
been struck down: the ban on outdoor advertising, the ban on brand
name sponsorship, and the bans on product samples and gifts. The
regulations on product samples and gifts are so similar that they are
discussed together. All four of these regulations clearly fail the Central
Hudson analysis as it has been applied over the past decade.
a. Ban on Outdoor Advertising
The ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of a public school
or playground should be struck down by the Sixth Circuit, as the exact
191
same provisions have already been held to be invalid in Lorillard. In
fact, Judge McKinley stated that the ban is “indistinguishable from the
Massachusetts’ ban the Supreme Court struck down in
192
LorillardFalse” However, because Congress instructed the FDA to
193
issue regulations to go into effect on June 22, 2010, Judge McKinley
concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge to the ban was not yet ripe in this
194
instance as it was only January. Interestingly, the FDA issued
regulations on March 19, 2010 that reserved its decision on
195
implementing the 1000-foot rule for a future time. The agency is
requesting comments and data that may have been developed since
1996 that will assist them in determining whether the 1000-foot rule
196
complies with Lorillard.
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court held that the restriction failed
prong four because the regulation was more extensive than necessary to
197
serve the asserted interest. Justice O’Connor stated that this regulation
191
192

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562 (2001).
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 535 (W.D. Ky.

2010).
193
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102,
123 Stat. 1776, 1831 (2009).
194
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36. Judge McKinley quoted
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991), which stated that plaintiffs alleging a First
Amendment violation must “demonstrate a live dispute involving the actual or threatened
application of [a statute or policy] to bar particular speech.” Id.
195
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225, 13,226 (Mar. 19, 2010)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140).
196
Id.
197
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001); see also supra Part II.
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was overbroad and demonstrated a lack of tailoring as it would “have
198
widely disparate effects nationwide.” The Kentucky District Court
agreed that a ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of a school or
199
playground was unconstitutional, yet because the FDA had not yet
200
issued the regulations, the plaintiffs had no immediate injury.
The research and information that the FDA receives will heavily
influence the outcome of this challenge. It does not appear likely that it
will pass constitutional muster, unless the rule is more closely tailored
to locations where children are present. In order to fit within the modern
strict interpretation of Central Hudson’s fourth prong, the regulation
may not be more extensive than necessary; in other words, the
government must prove that there was no other way to achieve its
201
interest. Simply banning tobacco advertisements on school grounds or
at public playgrounds appears to be the best way to achieve this goal
without impeding on the rights of the tobacco companies. A 1000-foot
radius rule covers far too much territory to remain within constitutional
boundaries, especially in urban areas.
b. Ban on Brand Name Sponsorship
Another provision that should be held unconstitutional is the ban
on brand name sponsorship. This regulation has no exceptions and
applies to all events, even a vague category of “social or cultural
202
events.” The Kentucky District Court concluded that there was a
203
reasonable fit between the means and the ends of the sponsorship ban.
The FDA has promulgated regulations prohibiting tobacco companies
from using their brand names to sponsor any athletic event, musical
event, artistic event, social or cultural event, or any type of entry in any
204
event. A higher court should find that this is unconstitutional, and
198

Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 563.
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36.
200
Id. at 536.
201
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-72 (2002).
202
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,527 (Aug. 28, 1996),
reissued by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §
102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1830 (2009) (stating that the FDA is directed to re-issue the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 1996); see Commonwealth
Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
203
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
204
21 C.F.R. § 1140.34 (2010).
199
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therefore unenforceable, due to the overwhelming evidence that the ban
is a sweeping, overbroad regulation on the tobacco companies’ right to
communicate with adult consumers.
Even if the FDA is able to satisfy prong three of Central Hudson
by demonstrating that brand name sponsorship of events where children
are present has a direct correlation to children smoking, it will be unable
to show that there is a connection between sponsorship of adult-only
events and youth smoking. If sponsorships of adult-only events never
reach children, the FDA will not be able to present substantive proof
that these events have any effect on children. Next, prong four of the
Central Hudson test requires a close fit between the end goal and the
205
means used to achieve it. There is a clear lack of tailoring with this
blanket ban on all sponsorship of any type of event, as it prohibits
206
speech that will never reach children. For example, the Newport
cigarette brand sponsors a private, invitation-only blackjack tournament
207
in Las Vegas each year. The tournament has no impact on minors, as
minors are not even permitted to enter the casino where the tournament
208
is held, yet that sponsorship would be banned under the Act. Lorillard
suggested that a uniform and broad prohibition on communication
would be invalid unless the government can demonstrate the necessity
209
of the ban as it relates to their interest. Although the FDA has an
interest in protecting children, this does not justify an “unnecessarily
210
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.” An appellate court
should find that the ban on sponsorship violates the First Amendment
rights of the plaintiffs.
c. Bans on Product Samples and Gifts
The FDA blanket bans on product samples and gift promotions
should both reach a similar fate, as the restrictions are not narrowly
tailored to further the government goal of protecting minors. The
205

E.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
Others have criticized this provision of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act for the same reason stated herein. See Elaine Stoll, Student Article, The Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and the First Amendment: Why a Substantial
Interest in Protecting Public Health Won’t Save Some New Restrictions on Tobacco
Advertising, 65 Food & Drug L.J. 873, 897 (2010).
207
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 25.
208
Id.
209
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001).
210
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
206
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District Court did not find a commercial speech interest implicated here
because the distribution of product samples and the rewarding of
tobacco purchasers is conduct that can be directly regulated without
211
involving the First Amendment. This is incorrect, however, because
advertising extends beyond print ads and billboards. Advertising can
also include enticing lawful prospective consumers by letting them try
products before purchase, as well as rewarding loyal consumers by
awarding prizes for purchase. Tobacco companies have the right to
communicate information about their products through these alternative
methods and the Central Hudson framework should apply.
It is possible that these restrictions could pass the third prong of
Central Hudson because they are arguably effective at keeping tobacco
products and merchandise out of the hands of children; if products are
not given away, there is no chance that a child could come into contact
with them. These bans fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test,
however, because they are overbroad and restrict too much
communication with legal users. Both product samples and gift
promotions are currently strictly limited to adult smokers and
212
extraordinary measures are taken to ensure that minors are excluded.
However, the FDA promulgated bans on both of these practices in a
purported attempt to protect children from being targeted by tobacco
advertisements. The ban against promotions giving gifts in
consideration of tobacco purchases has no exceptions and is thus not
213
tailored at all to serve any governmental goal. The ban on product
211

Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 538-39 (W.D.
Ky. 2010).
212
For example, Lorillard’s “Newport Pleasure Goods” program allows adult smokers
to collect UPC labels from cigarettes and send them to the company in exchange for prizes.
All participants must be able to affirmatively demonstrate that they are at least twenty-one
years of age in order to participate. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 29. The website
for Newport Pleasure Goods requires smokers to become members. NEWPORT PLEASURE
GOODS, http://www.newport-pleasure.com/index.aspx (last visited May 5, 2011). In order to
become a member, a smoker must first enter his or her birthday, and then fill out a
registration form that includes the last four digits of a social security number, as well as a
driver license number so that the company can verify that all members are over age twentyone. Id. (follow “Click Here To Sign Up” link). This is in stark contrast to websites that sell
alcohol. For example, a customer can buy beer from the Saranac Brewery and have it
shipped to them, so long as state law permits shipment of beer. My Saranac, MOTT
BREWING COMPANY, http://mysaranac.com/index.html (last visited May 5, 2011). The only
age verification in this process is the requirement that the person who signs for the package
must be twenty-one years old. Frequently Asked Questions & Answers, MOTT BREWING
COMPANY, http://mysaranac.com/SiteFAQs.asp (last visited May 5, 2011).
213
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
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samples does contain an exception for smokeless tobacco: product
samples of smokeless tobacco can be distributed, but only in facilities
214
that do not serve alcohol. This is inconsistent with the government’s
purported goal of preventing youth smoking because it allows the
distribution of product samples of smokeless tobacco, but interestingly
only in areas where children are permitted, such as restaurants, and not
in facilities that serve alcohol and only allow adults to enter, such as
bars and nightclubs. As stated in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Ass’n, a regulation that is so “pierced by exemptions and
215
inconsistencies” cannot be upheld. The Sixth Circuit should therefore
invalidate these unlawful provisions.
VI. SOLUTION: REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE ACT.
The stated goal of the Act is to reduce the use of tobacco products
216
by children under the age of eighteen. Congressional findings state
that “such regulations are narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising
and promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use, while affording
tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to convey
217
information about their products to adult consumers.” However, many
of the regulations are over-broad and restrict more speech than
necessary in order to reduce children’s access to and demand for
tobacco. A better solution is for the government to regulate tobacco
products directly, instead of attempting to prevent advertising and
marketing of legal products. Regulating speech must always be a last
218
resort, not a first resort. Alternative ways to achieve the goal of
reducing youth smoking include criminalizing the underage possession
of tobacco products, imposing greater penalties on those retailers who
allow minors to purchase tobacco products, and creating educational
programs to teach children about the dangers of tobacco use.
Next, any regulations imposed on the advertising or marketing of
tobacco products should be strictly limited to those instances in which
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,527, reissued by
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102, 123 Stat.
1776, 1830-31 (2009).
214
§ 102, 123 Stat. at 1831; 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(d) (2010).
215
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999).
216
§ 2, 123 Stat. at 1779.
217
Id.
218
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
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children are affected. Restrictions that prohibit advertising in bars,
nightclubs, and casinos are not narrowly tailored because these places
require proof of age in order to enter. Any advertising that takes place in
adult-only facilities cannot be restricted in order to achieve the goal of
reducing tobacco use by minors. In addition, direct marketing
campaigns, such as the promotional gift programs that strictly verify
participants’ age, should be beyond the scope of the statute because they
also do not reach children.
CONCLUSION
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act states
that its goal is to reduce youth smoking, yet the Act actually attempts to
target all smokers. Although Congress made it clear that the use of
tobacco products was not completely banned, it then proceeded to cut
off almost every way that tobacco manufacturers can communicate with
adult smokers.
This Act sets a dangerous precedent for other “vice” products
because it aims to prevent adults from making an educated decision as
to what they want to be exposed. As the Supreme Court held that
paternalistic goals are impermissible motives for restrictions on
219
speech,
and that there is no “vice” exception to the First
220
Amendment, the government may not create speech barriers between
tobacco companies and adult consumers. There must be a balance
between the governmental interest in protecting children from health
risks associated with tobacco use and the tobacco company’s interest in
running a business selling a legal product. The government must either
completely outlaw tobacco, or remove the restrictions on advertising so
that adults can weigh the risks of tobacco use for themselves. What the
government may not do is allow a company to manufacture a legal
product and then sabotage their efforts to run a business by violating
their First Amendment rights.

219
220

Id. at 375.
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996).

